This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate aws-throwaway

Dependencies

(17 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 aws-sdk-ec2^1.1.01.250.0up to date
 aws-sdk-iam^1.1.01.122.0up to date
 aws-sdk-sts^1.1.01.113.0up to date
 aws-config^1.0.01.11.0up to date
 russh ⚠️^0.55.00.63.1out of date
 base64^0.22.00.23.1out of date
 ssh-key^0.6.10.6.7up to date
 tokio^1.25.01.53.1up to date
 anyhow^1.0.421.0.104up to date
 uuid^1.0.01.26.0up to date
 tracing^0.1.150.1.44up to date
 serde^1.0.1951.0.229up to date
 serde_json^1.0.1111.0.151up to date
 futures^0.3.300.3.34up to date
 reqwest^0.13.00.13.4up to date
 rand^0.10.00.10.2up to date
 russh-sftp^2.1.12.4.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tracing-subscriber ⚠️^0.3.10.3.23maybe insecure
 tracing-appender^0.2.00.2.5up to date
 clap^4.0.44.6.6up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tracing-subscriber: Logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences

RUSTSEC-2025-0055

Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:

  • Manipulate terminal title bars
  • Clear screens or modify terminal display
  • Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation

In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.

This was patched in PR #3368 to escape ANSI control characters from user input.

russh: Unbounded 32-bit allocation

RUSTSEC-2026-0154

Both the SSH agent server and client accepted peer-controlled frame lengths without enforcing a maximum frame size. This could cause large memory allocations while parsing a maliciously crafted agent frame.

A malicious peer could advertise an oversized frame length, causing the client or server to attempt a large memory allocation before validating the frame, potentially leading to memory exhaustion or process termination.

This is fixed by enforcing a maximum agent frame size of 256 KiB and rejecting oversized frames before buffer allocation.