This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
In versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar
crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to check
whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because fs::metadata()
follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed
by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink
target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This
allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside
the extraction root.
This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.
tar: tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero
Versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs have conditional logic that skips the PAX
size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero.
As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar
project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it
was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the
astral-tokio-tar issue.
Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create
archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this
case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size
— other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally
use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to
parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers.
