Deps.rs

rowanclarke / rs-remediate

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/repo/github/rowanclarke/rs-remediate/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/repo/github/rowanclarke/rs-remediate)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate remediate

Dependencies

(10 total, 4 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 rand^0.8.50.10.2out of date
 pest^2.6.02.9.0up to date
 pest_derive^2.6.02.9.0up to date
 from-pest^0.3.20.3.4up to date
 pest-ast^0.3.30.3.6up to date
 bincode^1.3.33.0.0out of date
 serde^1.0.1641.0.229up to date
 rkyv ⚠️^0.7.420.8.18out of date
 num_enum^0.6.10.7.6out of date
 pathdiff^0.2.10.2.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 tempdir^0.3.70.3.7up to date
 once_cell^1.18.01.21.4up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rkyv: Insufficient archive validation can cause out-of-bounds reads in archives containing Rc/Arc

RUSTSEC-2026-0235

Shared pointer validation keyed already-validated pointees by their address and type, but did not include pointer metadata. For unsized pointees, an archive could therefore contain multiple Rc, Arc, or weak pointers that shared a data address but used different metadata, such as different slice lengths.

Once the first pointer had been validated, later pointers to the same address skipped pointee validation. The safe checked rkyv::access API could consequently return a slice with a forged length, allowing safe indexing to read out of bounds. The same validation bypass was reachable through checked deserialization with rkyv::from_bytes.

Version 0.8.17 includes pointer metadata in shared pointer validation and rejects conflicting metadata. The 0.7 series is also affected but is no longer supported by upstream. Users who process untrusted archives should upgrade to 0.8.17 or later.