This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate wasmio

Dependencies

(16 total, 7 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-stream^0.30.3.6up to date
 axum-serde^0.20.9.0out of date
 axum-extra^0.90.12.5out of date
 base64ct^11.8.3up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 dotenv^0.150.15.0up to date
 headers^0.40.4.1up to date
 if_chain^1.0.21.0.3up to date
 quick-xml^0.310.39.2out of date
 serde_json^11.0.149up to date
 parking_lot=0.12.10.12.5out of date
 sha2^0.100.11.0out of date
 strum^0.260.28.0out of date
 thiserror^12.0.18out of date
 ulid^11.2.1up to date
 urlencoding^22.1.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 tempfile^33.27.0up to date
 insta^11.46.3up to date
 http-body-util^0.10.1.3up to date
 http^11.4.0up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 wasm-bindgen-futures=0.4.400.4.64out of date
 ntest^0.90.9.5up to date

Build dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono^0.4.330.4.44up to date

Crate wasmio-aws-types

Dependencies

(2 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 derivative^22.2.0up to date
 derive_builder^0.130.20.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.