This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized
vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image
format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before
initializing all instances.
This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to
use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.
Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by
ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer
called in case of panic, though.
Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires
callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead,
avoiding all unsafe code.
nalgebra: VecStorage Deserialize Allows Violation of Length Invariant
The Deserialize implementation for VecStorage did not maintain the invariant that the number of elements must equal nrows * ncols. Deserialization of specially crafted inputs could allow memory access beyond allocation of the vector.
This flaw was introduced in v0.11.0 (086e6e) due to the addition of an automatically derived implementation of Deserialize for MatrixVec. MatrixVec was later renamed to VecStorage in v0.16.13 (0f66403) and continued to use the automatically derived implementation of Deserialize.
This flaw was corrected in commit 5bff536 by returning an error during deserialization if the number of elements does not exactly match the expected size.
