This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate qq-maid-bot

Dependencies

(5 total, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.103up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.52.3maybe insecure
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber ⚠️^0.30.3.23maybe insecure
 time ⚠️^0.30.3.51maybe insecure

Crate qq-maid-gateway-rs

Dependencies

(14 total, 1 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.103up to date
 async-trait^0.10.1.89up to date
 axum^0.80.8.9up to date
 dotenvy^0.150.15.7up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.32up to date
 reqwest^0.130.13.4up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.150up to date
 thiserror^22.0.18up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.52.3maybe insecure
 tokio-tungstenite^0.280.29.0out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber ⚠️^0.30.3.23maybe insecure
 time ⚠️^0.30.3.51maybe insecure

Crate qq-maid-core

Dependencies

(24 total, 1 outdated, 6 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.103up to date
 async-trait^0.10.1.89up to date
 ammonia ⚠️^44.1.2maybe insecure
 axum^0.80.8.9up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.45maybe insecure
 dotenvy^0.150.15.7up to date
 feed-rs^2.3.12.3.1up to date
 futures^0.30.3.32up to date
 html2text^0.17.10.17.1up to date
 pulldown-cmark^0.130.13.4up to date
 regex ⚠️^11.12.4maybe insecure
 reqwest^0.130.13.4up to date
 rusqlite^0.40.10.40.1up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.150up to date
 sha2^0.100.11.0out of date
 thiserror^22.0.18up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.52.3maybe insecure
 tower^0.50.5.3up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber ⚠️^0.30.3.23maybe insecure
 url^22.5.8up to date
 time ⚠️^0.30.3.51maybe insecure
 uuid^11.23.4up to date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 http-body-util^0.10.1.3up to date

Crate qq-maid-llm

Dependencies

(8 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.10.1.89up to date
 futures^0.30.3.32up to date
 reqwest^0.130.13.4up to date
 serde^11.0.228up to date
 serde_json^11.0.150up to date
 thiserror^22.0.18up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.52.3maybe insecure
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 axum^0.80.8.9up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.45maybe insecure
 tokio ⚠️^11.52.3maybe insecure

Crate qq-maid-common

Dependencies

(2 total, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.45maybe insecure
 regex ⚠️^11.12.4maybe insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse

RUSTSEC-2022-0013

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.

Overview

The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.

Mitigations

We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);

tracing-subscriber: Logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences

RUSTSEC-2025-0055

Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:

  • Manipulate terminal title bars
  • Clear screens or modify terminal display
  • Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation

In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.

This was patched in PR #3368 to escape ANSI control characters from user input.

ammonia: Incorrect handling of embedded SVG and MathML leads to mutation XSS after removal

RUSTSEC-2025-0071

Affected versions of this crate did not correctly strip namespace-incompatible tags in certain situations, causing it to incorrectly account for differences between HTML, SVG, and MathML.

This vulnerability only has an effect when the svg or math tag is allowed, because it relies on a tag being parsed as html during the cleaning process, but serialized in a way that causes in to be parsed as xml by the browser.

Additionally, the application using this library must allow a tag that is parsed as raw text in HTML. These elements are:

  • title
  • textarea
  • xmp
  • iframe
  • noembed
  • noframes
  • plaintext
  • noscript
  • style
  • script

Applications that do not explicitly allow any of these tags should not be affected, since none are allowed by default.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.