This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate qhyccd-alpaca

Dependencies

(17 total, 1 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.890.1.89up to date
 custom_debug^0.6.20.6.2up to date
 eyre^0.6.120.6.12up to date
 qhyccd-rs^0.1.90.1.9up to date
 ndarray^0.17.10.17.2up to date
 parking_lot^0.12.50.12.5up to date
 strum^0.27.20.28.0out of date
 tokio^1.48.01.50.0up to date
 tracing^0.1.410.1.44up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.3.200.3.23up to date
 cfg-if^1.0.41.0.4up to date
 educe^0.6.00.6.0up to date
 clap^4.5.514.6.0up to date
 time ⚠️^0.3.440.3.47maybe insecure
 bytes ⚠️^1.7.01.11.1maybe insecure
 openssl-sys^0.9.800.9.112up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.600.10.76maybe insecure

Dev dependencies

(4 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 mockall^0.14.00.14.0up to date
 rstest^0.26.10.26.1up to date
 reqwest^0.13.10.13.2up to date
 tokio^1.48.01.50.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.

time: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion

RUSTSEC-2026-0009

Impact

When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary, non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.

Patches

A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned rather than exhausting the stack.

Workarounds

Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.