HeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity. However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number in release mode.

If the map was not empty when the overflow happens, the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing. This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve() to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).

The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.

Affected versions of this crate incorrectly used raw pointer, which introduced unsoundness in its public safe API.

Failing to drop the Drain struct causes double-free, and it is possible to violate Rust's alias rule and cause data race with Drain's Iterator implementation.

The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

The Tungstenite crate through 0.20.0 for Rust allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (minutes of CPU consumption) via an excessive length of an HTTP header in a client handshake. The length affects both how many times a parse is attempted (e.g., thousands of times) and the average amount of data for each parse attempt (e.g., millions of bytes).