This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
bnuuy(17 total, 7 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| snafu | ^0.7 | 0.8.9 | out of date |
| input_buffer | ^0.5 | 0.5.0 | up to date |
| bytes | ^1.4 | 1.11.0 | up to date |
| amq-protocol | ^7.1 | 9.0.1 | out of date |
| mio | ^0.6 | 1.1.0 | out of date |
| mio-extras | ^2.0 | 2.0.6 | up to date |
| cookie-factory | ^0.3 | 0.3.3 | up to date |
| crossbeam-channel | ^0.5 | 0.5.15 | up to date |
| indexmap | ^2.0 | 2.12.1 | up to date |
| url | ^2.4.0 | 2.5.7 | up to date |
| percent-encoding | ^2.3 | 2.3.2 | up to date |
| tracing | ^0.1.37 | 0.1.43 | up to date |
| rustls ⚠️ | ^0.20 | 0.23.35 | out of date |
| rustls-connector | ^0.16.1 | 0.22.0 | out of date |
| webpki-roots | ^0.22 | 1.0.4 | out of date |
| rustls-native-certs | ^0.6 | 0.8.2 | out of date |
| native-tls | ^0.2.10 | 0.2.14 | up to date |
(3 total, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| uuid | ^1.4 | 1.18.1 | up to date |
| mockstream | ^0.0.3 | 0.0.3 | up to date |
| tracing-subscriber ⚠️ | ^0.3.17 | 0.3.22 | maybe insecure |
(1 total, 1 outdated)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| built | ^0.6.1 | 0.8.0 | out of date |
rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network inputIf a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io
does not terminate.
Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.
rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io
and are not affected.
rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use
complete_io and are affected.
tracing-subscriber: Logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequencesPrevious versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:
In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.
This was patched in PR #3368 to escape ANSI control characters from user input.