This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate challenge_server

Dependencies

(24 total, 10 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 log^0.4.170.4.27up to date
 simple_logger^4.2.05.0.0out of date
 tokio^1.33.01.44.2up to date
 tower-http^0.4.00.6.2out of date
 http^1.0.01.3.1up to date
 axum^0.6.200.8.3out of date
 axum-server^0.5.10.7.2out of date
 axum-extra^0.8.00.10.1out of date
 serde^1.0.1571.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.0.941.0.140up to date
 rand^0.8.40.9.1out of date
 tower-service^0.3.20.3.3up to date
 envcrypt^0.5.00.5.0up to date
 scoreboard_db^0.2.10.2.1up to date
 argon2^0.5.00.5.3up to date
 jsonwebtoken^9.1.09.3.1up to date
 sqlx ⚠️^0.7.20.8.5out of date
 chrono^0.4.240.4.41up to date
 rand_core^0.6.40.9.3out of date
 time^0.3.200.3.41up to date
 base64^0.21.00.22.1out of date
 uuid^1.3.01.16.0up to date
 redis^0.23.00.30.0out of date
 lettre^0.11.10.11.15up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

sqlx: Binary Protocol Misinterpretation caused by Truncating or Overflowing Casts

RUSTSEC-2024-0363

The following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord:

SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level
http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf
(Archive link for posterity.)

Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data.

It appears SQLx does perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163

This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions <= 0.8.0 are affected.

Mitigation

As always, you should make sure your application is validating untrustworthy user input. Reject any input over 4 GiB, or any input that could encode to a string longer than 4 GiB. Dynamically built queries are also potentially problematic if it pushes the message size over this 4 GiB bound.

Encode::size_hint() can be used for sanity checks, but do not assume that the size returned is accurate. For example, the Json<T> and Text<T> adapters have no reasonable way to predict or estimate the final encoded size, so they just return size_of::<T>() instead.

For web application backends, consider adding some middleware that limits the size of request bodies by default.

Resolution

sqlx 0.8.1 has been released with the fix: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#081---2024-08-23

Postgres users are advised to upgrade ASAP as a possible exploit has been demonstrated: https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/issues/3440#issuecomment-2307956901

MySQL and SQLite do not appear to be exploitable, but upgrading is recommended nonetheless.