This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate fireblocks-solana-signer

Dependencies

(21 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.220.22.1up to date
 bincode^12.0.1out of date
 bon^3.6.43.6.5up to date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️=1.0.12.2.0out of date
 fireblocks-config^0.10.1.7up to date
 fireblocks-signer-transport^0.10.1.1up to date
 log>=0.30.4.27up to date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_json^11.0.142up to date
 sha2^0.100.10.9up to date
 solana-pubkey>=2.12.4.0up to date
 solana-signer>=2.12.2.1up to date
 solana-signature>=2.12.3.0up to date
 solana-transaction>=2.12.2.3up to date
 solana-message>=2.12.4.0up to date
 solana-instruction>=2.12.3.0up to date
 solana-hash>=2.12.3.0up to date
 solana-keypair^22.2.3up to date
 rand^0.90.9.2up to date
 thiserror^22.0.12up to date
 tracing^0.10.1.41up to date

Dev dependencies

(10 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^11.0.98up to date
 dotenvy^0.150.15.7up to date
 spl-memo^66.0.0up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.19up to date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 solana-sdk^22.3.1up to date
 solana-account-decoder>=2.12.3.6up to date
 tokio ⚠️^11.47.1maybe insecure
 solana-rpc-client^22.3.6up to date
 solana-rpc-client-api^22.3.6up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.

tokio: reject_remote_clients Configuration corruption

RUSTSEC-2023-0001

On Windows, configuring a named pipe server with pipe_mode will force ServerOptions::reject_remote_clients as false.

This drops any intended explicit configuration for the reject_remote_clients that may have been set as true previously.

The default setting of reject_remote_clients is normally true meaning the default is also overridden as false.

Workarounds

Ensure that pipe_mode is set first after initializing a ServerOptions. For example:

let mut opts = ServerOptions::new();
opts.pipe_mode(PipeMode::Message);
opts.reject_remote_clients(true);