This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate zarrs_storage

Dependencies

(8 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.740.1.89up to date
 auto_impl^1.3.01.3.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.7.01.11.1maybe insecure
 derive_more^2.0.02.1.1up to date
 futures^0.3.290.3.32up to date
 itertools^0.14.00.14.0up to date
 thiserror^2.0.122.0.18up to date
 unsafe_cell_slice^0.2.00.2.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 tempfile^33.26.0up to date
 tokio^1.47.11.49.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.