This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tungstenite

Dependencies

(16 total, 4 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 byteorder^1.3.21.5.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.01.11.1maybe insecure
 data-encoding^22.10.0up to date
 http^1.01.4.0up to date
 httparse^1.3.41.10.1up to date
 log^0.4.80.4.29up to date
 native-tls^0.2.30.2.14up to date
 rand^0.8.00.10.0out of date
 rustls ⚠️^0.23.00.23.36maybe insecure
 rustls-native-certs^0.7.00.8.3out of date
 rustls-pki-types^1.01.14.0up to date
 sha1^0.100.10.6up to date
 thiserror^1.0.232.0.18out of date
 url^2.1.02.5.8up to date
 utf-8^0.7.50.7.6up to date
 webpki-roots^0.261.0.6out of date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 4 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.5.00.8.2out of date
 env_logger^0.10.00.11.8out of date
 input_buffer^0.5.00.5.0up to date
 rand^0.8.40.10.0out of date
 socket2^0.5.50.6.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.