This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.
trust-dns-server(23 total, 9 outdated, 2 insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| async-trait | ^0.1.43 | 0.1.92 | up to date |
| bytes | ^1 | 1.12.1 | up to date |
| cfg-if | ^1 | 1.0.5 | up to date |
| drain | ^0.1.1 | 0.2.1 | out of date |
| enum-as-inner | ^0.6 | 0.7.0 | out of date |
| futures-executor | ^0.3.5 | 0.3.34 | up to date |
| futures-util | ^0.3.5 | 0.3.34 | up to date |
| h2 ⚠️ | ^0.3.0 | 0.4.20 | insecure |
| http | ^0.2 | 1.5.0 | out of date |
| openssl | ^0.10.55 | 0.10.82 | up to date |
| rusqlite | ^0.29.0 | 0.42.0 | out of date |
| rustls ⚠️ | ^0.21.0 | 0.23.46 | insecure |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.229 | up to date |
| thiserror | ^1.0.20 | 2.0.21 | out of date |
| time | ^0.3 | 0.3.55 | up to date |
| tokio | ^1.21 | 1.54.1 | up to date |
| tokio-openssl | ^0.6.0 | 0.6.5 | up to date |
| tokio-rustls | ^0.24.0 | 0.26.6 | out of date |
| toml | ^0.7 | 1.2.1+spec-1.1.0 | out of date |
| tracing | ^0.1.30 | 0.1.44 | up to date |
| trust-dns-proto | ^0.23.2 | 0.23.2 | up to date |
| trust-dns-recursor | ^0.23.2 | 0.23.2 | up to date |
| trust-dns-resolver | ^0.23.2 | 0.23.2 | up to date |
(2 total, all up-to-date)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| tokio | ^1.21 | 1.54.1 | up to date |
| tracing-subscriber | ^0.3 | 0.3.23 | up to date |
h2: h2 unbounded empty DATA framesThe h2 crate, used internally by hyper, had a flaw that would accept and queue empty DATA frames without limit. If streams were not actively drained, this could lead to unbounded memory usage, or a panic if the length overflows.
Low severity.
Patched in v0.4.16.
rustls: `Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secretsThe Debug implementations of Tls12ClientSessionValue and
Tls13ClientSessionValue were derived, and so included the TLS 1.2 master
secret or TLS 1.3 resumption PSK in their output.
Custom ClientSessionStore implementations that format these values with
Debug (for example, when logging) could disclose these secrets to readers of
the logs. This conflicts with rustls's
key-material redaction policy.
Ordinary connection and built-in session cache Debug output is redacted and
is not affected.
rustls: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchangeThe client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.
A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello
selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that
name carry only an X25519 key share, while supported_groups still lists
X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than
sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake
completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as
long as the entry stays in the client's session store.
The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.
The following are not affected:
This behaviour is discussed in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.