This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
tract-onnx(11 total, 7 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| bytes | ^0.4.7 | 1.6.0 | out of date |
| derive-new | ^0.5 | 0.6.0 | out of date |
| error-chain | ^0.12 | 0.12.4 | up to date |
| itertools | ^0.8 | 0.12.1 | out of date |
| log | ^0.4 | 0.4.21 | up to date |
| num-integer | ^0.1 | 0.1.46 | up to date |
| num-traits | ^0.2 | 0.2.18 | up to date |
| prost ⚠️ | ^0.5 | 0.12.4 | out of date |
| smallvec ⚠️ | ^0.6 | 1.13.2 | out of date |
| tract-core | ^0.5.8 | 0.21.4 | out of date |
| tract-linalg | ^0.5.8 | 0.21.4 | out of date |
prost: Parsing a specially crafted message can result in a stack overflowAffected versions of this crate contained a bug in which decoding untrusted input could overflow the stack.
On architectures with stack probes (like x86), this can be used for denial of service attacks, while on architectures without stack probes (like ARM) overflowing the stack is unsound and can result in potential memory corruption (or even RCE).
The flaw was quickly corrected by @danburkert and released in version 0.6.1.
smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_manyA bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.
This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.
The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.
Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.