This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tfdeploy

Dependencies

(19 total, 11 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 accelerate-src^0.30.3.2up to date
 bit-set^0.50.5.3up to date
 blas-src^0.20.10.0out of date
 blis-src^0.1.00.2.1out of date
 derive-new^0.50.6.0out of date
 downcast-rs^1.01.2.1up to date
 error-chain^0.120.12.4up to date
 image ⚠️^0.190.25.1out of date
 itertools^0.70.12.1out of date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 maplit^1.01.0.2up to date
 ndarray^0.120.15.6out of date
 num^0.20.4.2out of date
 objekt^0.1.10.2.0out of date
 openblas-src^0.60.10.9out of date
 protobuf ⚠️^2.03.4.0out of date
 serde^1.01.0.197up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.197up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^0.61.13.2out of date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.20.5.1out of date
 simplelog^0.50.12.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

protobuf: Out of Memory in stream::read_raw_bytes_into()

RUSTSEC-2019-0003

Affected versions of this crate called Vec::reserve() on user-supplied input.

This allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory condition while calling the vulnerable method on untrusted data.

image: Flaw in interface may drop uninitialized instance of arbitrary types

RUSTSEC-2019-0014

Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before initializing all instances.

This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.

Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer called in case of panic, though.

Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead, avoiding all unsafe code.

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.