This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tentacle

Dependencies

(10 total, 7 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes^0.41.12.1out of date
 flatbuffers ⚠️^0.6.025.12.19insecure
 flatbuffers-verifier^0.2.00.2.1up to date
 futures^0.10.3.34out of date
 log^0.40.4.34up to date
 parity-multiaddr^0.4.00.11.2out of date
 tentacle-secio^0.1.70.6.9out of date
 tokio^0.11.53.1out of date
 tokio-threadpool^0.10.1.18up to date
 tokio-yamux^0.1.120.3.20out of date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 3 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 crossbeam-channel^0.3.60.5.17out of date
 env_logger^0.6.00.11.11out of date
 fnv^1.01.0.7up to date
 generic-channel^0.2.00.2.0up to date
 nix^0.13.00.31.3out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

flatbuffers: `read_scalar` and `read_scalar_at` allow transmuting values without `unsafe` blocks

RUSTSEC-2020-0009

The read_scalar and read_scalar_at functions are unsound because they allow transmuting values without unsafe blocks.

The following example shows how to create a dangling reference:

fn main() {
    #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
    struct S(&'static str);
    impl flatbuffers::EndianScalar for S {
        fn to_little_endian(self) -> Self { self }
        fn from_little_endian(self) -> Self { self }
    }
    println!("{:?}", flatbuffers::read_scalar::<S>(&[1; std::mem::size_of::<S>()]));
}

flatbuffers: Generated code can read and write out of bounds in safe code

RUSTSEC-2021-0122

Code generated by flatbuffers' compiler is unsafe but not marked as such. See https://github.com/google/flatbuffers/issues/6627 for details.

For example, if generated code is used to decode malformed or untrusted input, undefined behavior (and thus security vulnerabilities) is possible even without the use of the unsafe keyword, violating the the meaning of "safe" code;

All users that use generated code by flatbuffers compiler are recommended to:

  1. not expose flatbuffer generated code as part of their public APIs
  2. audit their code and look for any usage of follow, push, or any method that uses them (e.g. self_follow).
  3. Carefully go through the crates' documentation to understand which "safe" APIs are not intended to be used.