This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate tentacle-secio

Dependencies

(14 total, 10 outdated, 3 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bs58^0.3.00.5.1out of date
 bytes^0.41.12.1out of date
 flatbuffers ⚠️^0.6.025.12.19insecure
 flatbuffers-verifier^0.2.00.2.1up to date
 futures^0.10.3.34out of date
 log^0.4.10.4.34up to date
 molecule ⚠️^0.4.00.9.2insecure
 openssl^0.10.250.10.81up to date
 openssl-sys^0.90.9.117up to date
 rand^0.60.10.3out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.16.50.17.14insecure
 secp256k1^0.150.33.1out of date
 tokio^0.11.53.1out of date
 unsigned-varint^0.2.20.8.0out of date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.30.8.2out of date
 env_logger^0.60.11.11out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

flatbuffers: `read_scalar` and `read_scalar_at` allow transmuting values without `unsafe` blocks

RUSTSEC-2020-0009

The read_scalar and read_scalar_at functions are unsound because they allow transmuting values without unsafe blocks.

The following example shows how to create a dangling reference:

fn main() {
    #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
    struct S(&'static str);
    impl flatbuffers::EndianScalar for S {
        fn to_little_endian(self) -> Self { self }
        fn from_little_endian(self) -> Self { self }
    }
    println!("{:?}", flatbuffers::read_scalar::<S>(&[1; std::mem::size_of::<S>()]));
}

molecule: Partial read is incorrect in molecule

RUSTSEC-2021-0103

Anyone who uses total_size(..) function to partial read the length of any FixVec will get an incorrect result, due to an incorrect implementation. This has been resolved in the 0.7.2 release.

flatbuffers: Generated code can read and write out of bounds in safe code

RUSTSEC-2021-0122

Code generated by flatbuffers' compiler is unsafe but not marked as such. See https://github.com/google/flatbuffers/issues/6627 for details.

For example, if generated code is used to decode malformed or untrusted input, undefined behavior (and thus security vulnerabilities) is possible even without the use of the unsafe keyword, violating the the meaning of "safe" code;

All users that use generated code by flatbuffers compiler are recommended to:

  1. not expose flatbuffer generated code as part of their public APIs
  2. audit their code and look for any usage of follow, push, or any method that uses them (e.g. self_follow).
  3. Carefully go through the crates' documentation to understand which "safe" APIs are not intended to be used.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.