This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate sonic-rs

Dependencies

(13 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ahash^0.80.8.12up to date
 bumpalo^3.193.20.2up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.101.11.1maybe insecure
 cfg-if^1.01.0.4up to date
 faststr^0.20.2.34up to date
 itoa^1.01.0.17up to date
 ref-cast^1.01.0.25up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 simdutf8^0.10.1.5up to date
 sonic-number^0.10.1.1up to date
 sonic-simd^0.10.1.3up to date
 thiserror^2.02.0.18up to date
 zmij^1.01.0.21up to date

Dev dependencies

(7 total, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^1.41.11.1maybe insecure
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.44maybe insecure
 encoding_rs^0.80.8.35up to date
 paste^1.01.0.15up to date
 serde_bytes^0.110.11.19up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.