This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate solana-crate-features

Dependencies

(16 total, 7 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 backtrace^0.3.330.3.75up to date
 bytes^0.4.121.10.1out of date
 cc^1.0.451.2.29up to date
 curve25519-dalek ⚠️^1.1.34.2.0out of date
 either^1.5.21.15.0up to date
 failure^0.1.50.1.8up to date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 libc^0.2.620.2.174up to date
 rand_chacha^0.1.10.9.0out of date
 regex-syntax^0.6.120.8.5out of date
 reqwest^0.9.200.12.22out of date
 serde^1.0.1001.0.219up to date
 solana-ed25519-dalek^0.2.0N/Aup to date
 syn^1.0.32.0.104out of date
 tokio ⚠️^0.1.221.46.1out of date
 winapi^0.3.80.3.9up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

curve25519-dalek: Timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in curve25519-dalek.

The Scalar29::sub (32-bit) and Scalar52::sub (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (jns on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:

A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:

https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ

As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.

The fix can be validated in godbolt here:

The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner [email protected] and Lea Themint [email protected] using their DATA tool:

https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA