This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate rustyline

Dependencies

(18 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bitflags^1.22.5.0out of date
 cfg-if^1.01.0.0up to date
 clipboard-win^4.2.15.3.0out of date
 dirs-next^2.02.0.0up to date
 fd-lock^3.0.04.0.2out of date
 libc^0.20.2.153up to date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 memchr^2.02.7.2up to date
 nix ⚠️^0.220.28.0out of date
 radix_trie^0.20.2.1up to date
 regex ⚠️^1.5.41.10.4maybe insecure
 scopeguard^1.11.2.0up to date
 skim^0.90.10.4out of date
 smallvec^1.6.11.13.2up to date
 unicode-segmentation^1.01.11.0up to date
 unicode-width^0.10.1.11up to date
 utf8parse^0.20.2.1up to date
 winapi^0.30.3.9up to date

Dev dependencies

(5 total, 2 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 assert_matches^1.21.5.0up to date
 doc-comment^0.30.3.3up to date
 env_logger^0.90.11.3out of date
 rustyline-derive^0.5.00.10.0out of date
 tempfile^3.1.03.10.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

nix: Out-of-bounds write in nix::unistd::getgrouplist

RUSTSEC-2021-0119

On certain platforms, if a user has more than 16 groups, the nix::unistd::getgrouplist function will call the libc getgrouplist function with a length parameter greater than the size of the buffer it provides, resulting in an out-of-bounds write and memory corruption.

The libc getgrouplist function takes an in/out parameter ngroups specifying the size of the group buffer. When the buffer is too small to hold all of the requested user's group memberships, some libc implementations, including glibc and Solaris libc, will modify ngroups to indicate the actual number of groups for the user, in addition to returning an error. The version of nix::unistd::getgrouplist in nix 0.16.0 and up will resize the buffer to twice its size, but will not read or modify the ngroups variable. Thus, if the user has more than twice as many groups as the initial buffer size of 8, the next call to getgrouplist will then write past the end of the buffer.

The issue would require editing /etc/groups to exploit, which is usually only editable by the root user.

regex: Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse

RUSTSEC-2022-0013

The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the regex crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is "high" when the regex crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the regex crate are not affected by this vulnerability.

Overview

The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.

Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.

Affected versions

All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5.

Mitigations

We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate.

Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy, and for helping review the fix.

We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.