This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
rustls-ffi(6 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| libc | ^0.2 | 0.2.189 | up to date |
| log | ^0.4.17 | 0.4.34 | up to date |
| rustls-pki-types | ^1 | 1.15.1 | up to date |
| rustls ⚠️ | ^0.23.4 | 0.23.44 | maybe insecure |
| rustls-pemfile | ^2 | 2.2.0 | up to date |
| rustls-webpki ⚠️ | ^0.102.0 | 0.103.15 | out of date |
(1 total, all up-to-date)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| regex | ^1.9.6 | 1.13.1 | up to date |
rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received
TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use
rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.
Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.
Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.
Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.
rustls-webpki: CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logicIf a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.
The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.
This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)
More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.
This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.
rustls-webpki: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly acceptedName constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.
Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.
Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5. Thank you to @1seal for the report.
rustls-webpki: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard namePermitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.
This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint.
This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.
Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh. Thank you to @1seal for the report.
rustls-webpki: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsingA panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der]
or [OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty
BIT STRING appearing in the onlySomeReasons element of a IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.
This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.
Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.
Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.