This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
rlbot(5 total, 5 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| flatbuffers ⚠️ | ^0.5.0 | 24.3.25 | out of date |
| libloading | ^0.5.0 | 0.8.3 | out of date |
| nalgebra ⚠️ | ^0.18.0 | 0.32.5 | out of date |
| ratelimit | ^0.4.3 | 0.9.1 | out of date |
| smallvec ⚠️ | ^0.6.9 | 1.13.2 | out of date |
(4 total, 2 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| nalgebra ⚠️ | ^0.18.0 | 0.32.5 | out of date |
| rand | ^0.6.1 | 0.8.5 | out of date |
| winapi | ^0.3.5 | 0.3.9 | up to date |
| winproc | ^0.6.2 | 0.6.4 | up to date |
flatbuffers: Unsound `impl Follow for bool`The implementation of impl Follow for bool allows to reinterpret arbitrary bytes as a bool.
In Rust bool has stringent requirements for its in-memory representation. Use of this function
allows to violate these requirements and invoke undefined behaviour in safe code.
flatbuffers: `read_scalar` and `read_scalar_at` allow transmuting values without `unsafe` blocksThe read_scalar and read_scalar_at functions are unsound
because they allow transmuting values without unsafe blocks.
The following example shows how to create a dangling reference:
fn main() {
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
struct S(&'static str);
impl flatbuffers::EndianScalar for S {
fn to_little_endian(self) -> Self { self }
fn from_little_endian(self) -> Self { self }
}
println!("{:?}", flatbuffers::read_scalar::<S>(&[1; std::mem::size_of::<S>()]));
}
smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_manyA bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.
This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.
The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.
Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.
nalgebra: VecStorage Deserialize Allows Violation of Length InvariantThe Deserialize implementation for VecStorage did not maintain the invariant that the number of elements must equal nrows * ncols. Deserialization of specially crafted inputs could allow memory access beyond allocation of the vector.
This flaw was introduced in v0.11.0 (086e6e) due to the addition of an automatically derived implementation of Deserialize for MatrixVec. MatrixVec was later renamed to VecStorage in v0.16.13 (0f66403) and continued to use the automatically derived implementation of Deserialize.
This flaw was corrected in commit 5bff536 by returning an error during deserialization if the number of elements does not exactly match the expected size.
flatbuffers: Generated code can read and write out of bounds in safe codeCode generated by flatbuffers' compiler is unsafe but not marked as such.
See https://github.com/google/flatbuffers/issues/6627 for details.
For example, if generated code is used to decode malformed or untrusted input,
undefined behavior (and thus security vulnerabilities) is possible even without
the use of the unsafe keyword, violating the the meaning of "safe" code;
All users that use generated code by flatbuffers compiler are recommended to:
follow, push, or any method that uses them
(e.g. self_follow).