This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate reqwest

Dependencies

(28 total, 16 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.100.22.0out of date
 bytes^0.41.6.0out of date
 encoding_rs^0.80.8.33up to date
 futures^0.1.230.3.30out of date
 http ⚠️^0.1.151.1.0out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.12.221.2.0out of date
 hyper-old-types^0.110.11.0up to date
 hyper-rustls^0.160.27.0out of date
 hyper-tls^0.30.6.0out of date
 libflate^0.1.182.0.0out of date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 mime^0.3.70.3.17up to date
 mime_guess^2.0.0-alpha.62.0.4up to date
 native-tls^0.20.2.11up to date
 rustls^0.150.23.4out of date
 serde^1.01.0.197up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.115up to date
 serde_urlencoded^0.50.7.1out of date
 tokio ⚠️^0.1.71.36.0out of date
 tokio-executor^0.1.40.1.10up to date
 tokio-io^0.10.1.13up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.90.26.0out of date
 tokio-threadpool^0.1.80.1.18up to date
 tokio-timer^0.2.60.2.13up to date
 trust-dns-resolver^0.100.23.2out of date
 url^1.22.5.0out of date
 uuid^0.71.8.0out of date
 webpki-roots^0.160.26.1out of date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 env_logger^0.60.11.3out of date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.197up to date
 tokio-tcp^0.10.1.4up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

http: Integer Overflow in HeaderMap::reserve() can cause Denial of Service

RUSTSEC-2019-0033

HeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity. However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number in release mode.

If the map was not empty when the overflow happens, the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing. This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve() to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).

The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.

http: HeaderMap::Drain API is unsound

RUSTSEC-2019-0034

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.