This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate python-pkginfo

Dependencies

(10 total, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bzip2>=0.5.2, <0.7.00.6.1up to date
 flate2^1.0.331.1.9up to date
 fs-err^3.0.03.3.0up to date
 mailparse^0.160.16.1up to date
 rfc2047-decoder^1.0.61.1.0up to date
 serde^1.0.2101.0.228up to date
 tar ⚠️^0.4.410.4.45maybe insecure
 thiserror^2.0.32.0.18up to date
 xz2^0.1.70.1.7up to date
 zip>=0.6, <98.4.0up to date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde_json^1.0.1281.0.149up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tar: `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks

RUSTSEC-2026-0067

In versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because fs::metadata() follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

tar: tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

RUSTSEC-2026-0068

Versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero.

As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.

Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size — other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.