This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate pyo3

Dependencies

(22 total, 1 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^1.01.0.86up to date
 cfg-if^1.01.0.0up to date
 chrono^0.4.250.4.38up to date
 chrono-tz>=0.6, <0.90.9.0out of date
 either^1.91.12.0up to date
 eyre ⚠️>=0.4, <0.70.6.12maybe insecure
 hashbrown>=0.9, <0.150.14.5up to date
 indexmap>=1.6, <32.2.6up to date
 indoc^2.0.12.0.5up to date
 inventory^0.3.00.3.15up to date
 libc^0.2.620.2.155up to date
 memoffset^0.90.9.1up to date
 num-bigint^0.40.4.5up to date
 num-complex>=0.2, <0.50.4.6up to date
 parking_lot>=0.11, <0.130.12.3up to date
 portable-atomic^1.01.6.0up to date
 pyo3-ffi=0.21.20.21.2up to date
 pyo3-macros=0.21.20.21.2up to date
 rust_decimal^1.0.01.35.0up to date
 serde^1.01.0.203up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^1.01.13.2maybe insecure
 unindent^0.2.10.2.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(10 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 assert_approx_eq^1.1.01.1.0up to date
 chrono^0.4.250.4.38up to date
 chrono-tz>=0.6, <0.90.9.0out of date
 futures^0.3.280.3.30up to date
 proptest^1.01.4.0up to date
 rayon^1.6.11.10.0up to date
 send_wrapper^0.60.6.0up to date
 serde^1.01.0.203up to date
 serde_json^1.0.611.0.117up to date
 trybuild>=1.0.701.0.96up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

eyre: Parts of Report are dropped as the wrong type during downcast

RUSTSEC-2024-0021

In affected versions, after a Report is constructed using wrap_err or wrap_err_with to attach a message of type D onto an error of type E, then using downcast to recover ownership of either the value of type D or the value of type E, one of two things can go wrong:

  • If downcasting to E, there remains a value of type D to be dropped. It is incorrectly "dropped" by running E's drop behavior, rather than D's. For example if D is &str and E is std::io::Error, there would be a call of std::io::Error::drop in which the reference received by the Drop impl does not refer to a valid value of type std::io::Error, but instead to &str.

  • If downcasting to D, there remains a value of type E to be dropped. When D and E do not happen to be the same size, E's drop behavior is incorrectly executed in the wrong location. The reference received by the Drop impl may point left or right of the real E value that is meant to be getting dropped.

In both cases, when the Report contains an error E that has nontrivial drop behavior, the most likely outcome is memory corruption.

When the Report contains an error E that has trivial drop behavior (for example a Utf8Error) but where D has nontrivial drop behavior (such as String), the most likely outcome is that downcasting to E would leak D.