This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate prometheus

Dependencies

(9 total, 6 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 cfg-if^0.11.0.0out of date
 fnv^1.01.0.7up to date
 lazy_static^1.1.01.4.0up to date
 libc^0.20.2.153up to date
 procinfo^0.30.4.2out of date
 protobuf ⚠️^2.03.4.0out of date
 quick-error^1.2.22.0.1out of date
 reqwest^0.9.50.12.3out of date
 spin ⚠️^0.40.9.8out of date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 getopts^0.20.2.21up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.91.3.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

protobuf: Out of Memory in stream::read_raw_bytes_into()

RUSTSEC-2019-0003

Affected versions of this crate called Vec::reserve() on user-supplied input.

This allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory condition while calling the vulnerable method on untrusted data.

spin: Wrong memory orderings in RwLock potentially violates mutual exclusion

RUSTSEC-2019-0013

Wrong memory orderings inside the RwLock implementation allow for two writers to acquire the lock at the same time. The drop implementation used Ordering::Relaxed, which allows the compiler or CPU to reorder a mutable access on the locked data after the lock has been yielded.

Only users of the RwLock implementation are affected. Users of Once (including users of lazy_static with the spin_no_std feature enabled) are NOT affected.

On strongly ordered CPU architectures like x86, the only real way that this would lead to a memory corruption is if the compiler reorders an access after the lock is yielded, which is possible but in practice unlikely. It is a more serious issue on weakly ordered architectures such as ARM which, except in the presence of certain instructions, allow the hardware to decide which accesses are seen at what times. Therefore on an ARM system it is likely that using the wrong memory ordering would result in a memory corruption, even if the compiler itself doesn't reorder the memory accesses in a buggy way.

The flaw was corrected by https://github.com/mvdnes/spin-rs/pull/66.

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.