This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate polars-arrow

Dependencies

(31 total, 5 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 polars-arrow-format^0.2.00.2.1up to date
 async-stream^0.30.3.6up to date
 atoi_simd^0.170.18.1out of date
 avro-schema^0.30.3.0up to date
 bitflags^22.11.0up to date
 bytemuck^1.221.25.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.111.11.1maybe insecure
 chrono ⚠️<=0.4.410.4.44out of date
 chrono-tz^0.100.10.4up to date
 dyn-clone^11.0.20up to date
 either^1.141.15.0up to date
 ethnum^1.3.21.5.2up to date
 futures^0.3.250.3.32up to date
 getrandom^0.20.4.2out of date
 half^2.7.12.7.1up to date
 hashbrown^0.16.00.16.1up to date
 itoa^1.0.61.0.18up to date
 lz4^1.241.28.1up to date
 num-traits^0.20.2.19up to date
 polars-buffer^0.53.00.53.0up to date
 polars-error^0.53.00.53.0up to date
 polars-schema^0.53.00.53.0up to date
 polars-utils^0.53.00.53.0up to date
 proptest^1.61.11.0up to date
 schemars^0.9.01.2.1out of date
 serde^1.0.1881.0.228up to date
 simdutf8^0.1.40.1.5up to date
 streaming-iterator^0.1.90.1.9up to date
 strum_macros^0.270.28.0out of date
 tokio^1.441.50.0up to date
 zstd^0.130.13.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 proptest^1.61.11.0up to date
 rand^0.90.10.0out of date
 tokio^1.441.50.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.