This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate noria

Dependencies

(23 total, 8 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 arccstr^1.2.01.3.1up to date
 assert_infrequent^0.1.00.1.0up to date
 async-bincode^0.4.50.7.2out of date
 bincode^1.0.01.3.3up to date
 bufstream^0.1.30.1.4up to date
 byteorder^1.0.01.5.0up to date
 chrono ⚠️^0.4.00.4.38maybe insecure
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 fnv^1.0.51.0.7up to date
 futures^0.1.160.3.30out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.12.01.3.1out of date
 mio^0.6.90.8.11out of date
 net2^0.20.2.39up to date
 nom-sql^0.0.40.0.11out of date
 petgraph^0.4.110.6.4out of date
 serde^1.0.81.0.198up to date
 serde_derive^1.0.81.0.198up to date
 serde_json^1.0.21.0.116up to date
 slog^2.4.02.7.0up to date
 slog-term^2.4.02.9.1up to date
 tokio ⚠️^0.11.37.0out of date
 vec_map^0.8.00.8.2up to date
 zookeeper^0.5.30.8.0out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.