Deps.rs

nanocurrency-types 0.3.17

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/nanocurrency-types/0.3.17/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/nanocurrency-types/0.3.17)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate nanocurrency-types

Dependencies

(11 total, 8 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 blake2^0.80.10.6out of date
 byteorder^11.5.0up to date
 curve25519-dalek^1.0.14.1.2out of date
 digest^0.80.10.7out of date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^0.92.1.1out of date
 hex^0.30.4.3out of date
 num-bigint^0.10.4.4out of date
 num-traits^0.10.2.18out of date
 rand^0.6.50.8.5out of date
 serde^1.0.531.0.198up to date
 serde_derive^1.0.531.0.198up to date

Dev dependencies

(1 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 serde_json^1.0.171.0.116up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.