This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
multipart(12 total, 11 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| buf_redux | ^0.1 | 0.8.4 | out of date |
| env_logger | ^0.3 | 0.11.3 | out of date |
| hyper ⚠️ | ^0.7 | 1.3.1 | out of date |
| iron | ^0.2 | 0.6.1 | out of date |
| log | ^0.3 | 0.4.21 | out of date |
| memchr | ^0.1 | 2.7.2 | out of date |
| mime | ^0.1 | 0.3.17 | out of date |
| mime_guess | =1.5 | 2.0.4 | out of date |
| nickel | ^0.7 | 0.11.0 | out of date |
| rand | ^0.3 | 0.8.5 | out of date |
| tempdir | ^0.3 | 0.3.7 | up to date |
| tiny_http ⚠️ | ^0.5 | 0.12.0 | out of date |
hyper: HTTPS MitM vulnerability due to lack of hostname verificationWhen used on Windows platforms, all versions of Hyper prior to 0.9.4 did not perform hostname verification when making HTTPS requests.
This allows an attacker to perform MitM attacks by preventing any valid CA-issued certificate, even if there's a hostname mismatch.
The problem was addressed by leveraging rust-openssl's built-in support for hostname verification.
hyper: headers containing newline characters can split messagesSerializing of headers to the socket did not filter the values for newline bytes (\r or \n),
which allowed for header values to split a request or response. People would not likely include
newlines in the headers in their own applications, so the way for most people to exploit this
is if an application constructs headers based on unsanitized user input.
This issue was fixed by replacing all newline characters with a space during serialization of a header value.
tiny_http: HTTP Request smuggling through malformed Transfer Encoding headersHTTP pipelining issues and request smuggling attacks are possible due to incorrect Transfer encoding header parsing.
It is possible conduct HTTP request smuggling attacks (CL:TE/TE:TE) by sending invalid Transfer Encoding headers.
By manipulating the HTTP response the attacker could poison a web-cache, perform an XSS attack, or obtain sensitive information from requests other than their own.
hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smugglinghyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data lossWhen decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.