This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate libunftp

Dependencies

(26 total, 10 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.750.1.89up to date
 bitflags^2.4.12.11.0up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.5.01.11.1maybe insecure
 chrono^0.4.310.4.44up to date
 dashmap^5.5.36.1.0out of date
 derive_more^0.99.172.1.1out of date
 futures-util^0.3.290.3.32up to date
 getrandom^0.2.110.4.2out of date
 lazy_static^1.4.01.5.0up to date
 libc^0.20.2.183up to date
 md-5^0.10.60.10.6up to date
 moka^0.11.30.12.15out of date
 prometheus^0.13.30.14.0out of date
 proxy-protocol^0.5.00.5.0up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.21.100.23.37out of date
 rustls-pemfile^1.0.42.2.0out of date
 slog^2.7.02.8.2up to date
 slog-stdlog^4.1.14.1.1up to date
 thiserror^1.0.512.0.18out of date
 tokio^1.35.11.50.0up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.24.10.26.4out of date
 tokio-util^0.7.100.7.18up to date
 tracing^0.1.400.1.44up to date
 tracing-attributes^0.1.270.1.31up to date
 uuid^1.6.11.22.0up to date
 x509-parser^0.14.00.18.1out of date

Dev dependencies

(2 total, all up-to-date)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 pretty_assertions^1.4.01.4.1up to date
 tokio^1.35.11.50.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.