This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
hyper_serde(8 total, 5 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| cookie | ^0.11 | 0.18.1 | out of date |
| headers | ^0.2 | 0.4.0 | out of date |
| http ⚠️ | ^0.1 | 1.1.0 | out of date |
| hyper ⚠️ | ^0.12 | 1.3.1 | out of date |
| mime | ^0.3 | 0.3.17 | up to date |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.198 | up to date |
| serde_bytes | ^0.11 | 0.11.14 | up to date |
| time ⚠️ | ^0.1 | 0.3.36 | out of date |
(2 total, 1 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| serde_test | ^1.0 | 1.0.176 | up to date |
| time ⚠️ | ^0.1 | 0.3.36 | out of date |
http: Integer Overflow in HeaderMap::reserve() can cause Denial of ServiceHeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity.
However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number
in release mode.
If the map was not empty when the overflow happens,
the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing.
This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve()
to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).
The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.
http: HeaderMap::Drain API is unsoundAffected versions of this crate incorrectly used raw pointer, which introduced unsoundness in its public safe API.
Failing to drop the Drain struct causes double-free, and it is possible to violate Rust's alias rule and cause data race with Drain's Iterator implementation.
The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.
time: Potential segfault in the time crateUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
The affected functions from time 0.2.7 through 0.2.22 are:
time::UtcOffset::local_offset_attime::UtcOffset::try_local_offset_attime::UtcOffset::current_local_offsettime::UtcOffset::try_current_local_offsettime::OffsetDateTime::now_localtime::OffsetDateTime::try_now_localThe affected functions in time 0.1 (all versions) are:
atat_utcnowNon-Unix targets (including Windows and wasm) are unaffected.
Pending a proper fix, the internal method that determines the local offset has been modified to always return None on the affected operating systems. This has the effect of returning an Err on the try_* methods and UTC on the non-try_* methods.
Users and library authors with time in their dependency tree should perform cargo update, which will pull in the updated, unaffected code.
Users of time 0.1 do not have a patch and should upgrade to an unaffected version: time 0.2.23 or greater or the 0.3 series.
A possible workaround for crates affected through the transitive dependency in chrono, is to avoid using the default oldtime feature dependency of the chrono crate by disabling its default-features and manually specifying the required features instead.
Cargo.toml:
chrono = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["serde"] }
chrono = { version = "0.4.22", default-features = false, features = ["clock"] }
Commandline:
cargo add chrono --no-default-features -F clock
Sources:
hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smugglinghyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data lossWhen decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.