This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate httpmock

Dependencies

(24 total, 3 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 assert-json-diff^2.02.0.2up to date
 async-object-pool^0.10.1.5up to date
 async-trait^0.10.1.83up to date
 base64^0.210.22.1out of date
 basic-cookies^0.10.1.5up to date
 clap^4.34.5.20up to date
 colored^2.02.1.0up to date
 crossbeam-utils^0.80.8.20up to date
 env_logger^0.100.11.5out of date
 form_urlencoded^1.21.2.1up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.31up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.141.5.0out of date
 isahc^1.71.7.2up to date
 lazy_static^1.41.5.0up to date
 levenshtein^1.01.0.5up to date
 log^0.40.4.22up to date
 regex^1.91.11.1up to date
 serde^1.01.0.214up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.132up to date
 serde_regex^1.11.1.0up to date
 serde_yaml^0.90.9.34+deprecatedup to date
 similar^2.22.6.0up to date
 tokio^1.291.41.0up to date
 url^2.42.5.3up to date

Dev dependencies

(9 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-rt^2.82.10.0up to date
 async-std^1.121.13.0up to date
 colored^2.02.1.0up to date
 env_logger^0.100.11.5out of date
 isahc^1.71.7.2up to date
 quote^1.01.0.37up to date
 syn^2.02.0.87up to date
 tokio-test^0.40.4.4up to date
 ureq^2.72.10.1up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.