This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate hedwig

Dependencies

(11 total, 8 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.100.22.0out of date
 google-pubsub1^1.0.85.0.4+20240227out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.101.3.1out of date
 hyper-rustls^0.60.27.1out of date
 serde^1.01.0.198up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.116up to date
 thiserror^11.0.58up to date
 url^1.72.5.0out of date
 uuid^0.71.8.0out of date
 valico^3.14.0.0out of date
 yup-oauth2^1.08.3.3out of date

Dev dependencies

(4 total, 3 outdated, 1 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 assert_matches^1.31.5.0up to date
 rust-embed ⚠️^4.38.3.0out of date
 strum^0.150.26.2out of date
 strum_macros^0.150.26.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

rust-embed: RustEmbed generated `get` method allows for directory traversal when reading files from disk

RUSTSEC-2021-0126

When running in debug mode and the debug-embed (off by default) feature is not enabled, the generated get method does not check that the input path is a child of the folder given.

This allows attackers to read arbitrary files in the file system if they have control over the filename given. The following code will print the contents of your /etc/passwd if adjusted with a correct number of ../s depending on where it is run from.

#[derive(rust_embed::RustEmbed)]
#[folder = "src/"]
pub struct Asset;

fn main() {
    let d = Asset::get("../../../etc/passwd").unwrap().data;
    println!("{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&d));
}

The flaw was corrected by canonicalizing the input filename and ensuring that it starts with the canonicalized folder path.