This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate grin_wallet_controller

Dependencies

(25 total, 15 outdated, 2 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono^0.4.40.4.45up to date
 easy-jsonrpc^0.5.10.5.3up to date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 failure_derive^0.10.1.8up to date
 futures^0.10.3.34out of date
 grin_wallet_api^1.1.05.4.1out of date
 grin_wallet_config^1.1.05.4.1out of date
 grin_wallet_impls^1.1.05.4.1out of date
 grin_wallet_libwallet^1.1.05.4.1out of date
 grin_wallet_util^1.1.05.4.1out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.121.11.1insecure
 lazy_static^11.5.0up to date
 log^0.40.4.34up to date
 prettytable-rs^0.70.10.0out of date
 rand^0.50.10.3out of date
 ring ⚠️^0.130.17.14insecure
 serde^11.0.229up to date
 serde_derive^11.0.229up to date
 serde_json^11.0.151up to date
 term^0.51.2.1out of date
 tokio=0.1.111.53.1out of date
 tokio-core^0.10.1.18up to date
 tokio-retry^0.10.3.2out of date
 url^1.7.02.5.8out of date
 uuid^0.71.26.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

ring: Some AES functions may panic when overflow checking is enabled.

RUSTSEC-2025-0009

ring::aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey::new_mask() may panic when overflow checking is enabled. In the QUIC protocol, an attacker can induce this panic by sending a specially-crafted packet. Even unintentionally it is likely to occur in 1 out of every 2**32 packets sent and/or received.

On 64-bit targets operations using ring::aead::{AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM} may panic when overflow checking is enabled, when encrypting/decrypting approximately 68,719,476,700 bytes (about 64 gigabytes) of data in a single chunk. Protocols like TLS and SSH are not affected by this because those protocols break large amounts of data into small chunks. Similarly, most applications will not attempt to encrypt/decrypt 64GB of data in one chunk.

Overflow checking is not enabled in release mode by default, but RUSTFLAGS="-C overflow-checks" or overflow-checks = true in the Cargo.toml profile can override this. Overflow checking is usually enabled by default in debug mode.