This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate fractal-api

Dependencies

(5 total, 2 outdated, 1 insecure, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.20.4.37out of date
 fractal-dto^0.8.30.8.3up to date
 fractal-utils^0.30.3.4up to date
 hyper ⚠️^0.61.2.0out of date
 rustc-serialize ⚠️^0.30.3.25insecure

Security Vulnerabilities

hyper: HTTPS MitM vulnerability due to lack of hostname verification

RUSTSEC-2016-0002

When used on Windows platforms, all versions of Hyper prior to 0.9.4 did not perform hostname verification when making HTTPS requests.

This allows an attacker to perform MitM attacks by preventing any valid CA-issued certificate, even if there's a hostname mismatch.

The problem was addressed by leveraging rust-openssl's built-in support for hostname verification.

hyper: headers containing newline characters can split messages

RUSTSEC-2017-0002

Serializing of headers to the socket did not filter the values for newline bytes (\r or \n), which allowed for header values to split a request or response. People would not likely include newlines in the headers in their own applications, so the way for most people to exploit this is if an application constructs headers based on unsanitized user input.

This issue was fixed by replacing all newline characters with a space during serialization of a header value.

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.

rustc-serialize: Stack overflow in rustc_serialize when parsing deeply nested JSON

RUSTSEC-2022-0004

When parsing JSON using json::Json::from_str, there is no limit to the depth of the stack, therefore deeply nested objects can cause a stack overflow, which aborts the process.

Example code that triggers the vulnerability is

fn main() {
    let _ = rustc_serialize::json::Json::from_str(&"[0,[".repeat(10000));
}

serde is recommended as a replacement to rustc_serialize.