This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
finchers(17 total, 10 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| bitflags | ^1.0.4 | 2.6.0 | out of date |
| bytes | ^0.4.9 | 1.8.0 | out of date |
| cookie | ^0.11.0 | 0.18.1 | out of date |
| either | ^1.5.0 | 1.13.0 | up to date |
| failure | ^0.1.2 | 0.1.8 | up to date |
| futures | ^0.1.23 | 0.3.31 | out of date |
| http ⚠️ | ^0.1.10 | 1.1.0 | out of date |
| hyper ⚠️ | ^0.12.7 | 1.5.0 | out of date |
| log | ^0.4.3 | 0.4.22 | up to date |
| mime | ^0.3.8 | 0.3.17 | up to date |
| mime_guess | ^2.0.0-alpha.6 | 2.0.5 | up to date |
| percent-encoding | ^1.0.1 | 2.3.1 | out of date |
| serde | ^1.0.71 | 1.0.214 | up to date |
| serde_json | ^1.0.24 | 1.0.132 | up to date |
| serde_qs | ^0.4.1 | 0.13.0 | out of date |
| tokio ⚠️ | ^0.1.8 | 1.41.0 | out of date |
| url | ^1.7.1 | 2.5.3 | out of date |
(1 total, all up-to-date)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| matches | ^0.1.8 | 0.1.10 | up to date |
http: Integer Overflow in HeaderMap::reserve() can cause Denial of ServiceHeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity.
However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number
in release mode.
If the map was not empty when the overflow happens,
the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing.
This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve()
to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).
The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.
http: HeaderMap::Drain API is unsoundAffected versions of this crate incorrectly used raw pointer, which introduced unsoundness in its public safe API.
Failing to drop the Drain struct causes double-free, and it is possible to violate Rust's alias rule and cause data race with Drain's Iterator implementation.
The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.
hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smugglinghyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers.
Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.
To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents
but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.
hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data lossWhen decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation,
this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.
To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send
requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible,
any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.
tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channelIf a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the
oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the
oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding
oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.
When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.
Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used
after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the
Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close,
is not affected.
See tokio#4225 for more details.