This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate dioxus-fullstack

Dependencies

(39 total, 13 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-trait^0.1.580.1.89up to date
 aws-lc-rs^1.8.11.16.2up to date
 axum^0.7.00.8.8out of date
 base64^0.22.10.22.1up to date
 bytes ⚠️^1.4.01.11.1maybe insecure
 ciborium^0.2.10.2.2up to date
 dioxus-cli-config^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus-desktop^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus-devtools^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus-history^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus-interpreter-js^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus-isrg^0.6.20.6.2up to date
 dioxus-lib^0.6.20.6.2up to date
 dioxus-mobile^0.6.20.6.2up to date
 dioxus-ssr^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus-web^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 dioxus_server_macro^0.6.20.6.2up to date
 futures-channel^0.3.310.3.32up to date
 futures-util^0.30.3.32up to date
 generational-box^0.6.20.7.3out of date
 http^1.0.01.4.0up to date
 hyper^1.0.01.8.1up to date
 hyper-rustls^0.27.20.27.7up to date
 once_cell^1.17.11.21.4up to date
 parking_lot^0.12.10.12.5up to date
 pin-project^1.1.21.1.11up to date
 rustls ⚠️^0.23.120.23.37maybe insecure
 serde^1.0.1591.0.228up to date
 server_fn^0.6.50.8.11out of date
 thiserror^1.0.402.0.18out of date
 tokio^1.401.50.0up to date
 tokio-stream^0.1.120.1.18up to date
 tokio-util^0.7.80.7.18up to date
 tower^0.4.130.5.3out of date
 tower-http^0.5.20.6.8out of date
 tower-layer^0.3.20.3.3up to date
 tracing^0.1.370.1.44up to date
 tracing-futures^0.2.50.2.5up to date
 web-sys^0.3.610.3.91up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept`

RUSTSEC-2024-0399

A bug introduced in rustls 0.23.13 leads to a panic if the received TLS ClientHello is fragmented. Only servers that use rustls::server::Acceptor::accept() are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's LazyConfigAcceptor API are affected.

Servers that use tokio-rustls's TlsAcceptor API are not affected.

Servers that use rustls-ffi's rustls_acceptor_accept API are affected.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.