This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate crev-data

Dependencies

(11 total, 8 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.38maybe insecure
 common_failures^0.10.2.0out of date
 crev-common^0.80.25.4out of date
 derive_builder^0.70.20.0out of date
 ed25519-dalek ⚠️^1.0.0-pre.12.1.1out of date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 rand^0.60.8.5out of date
 semver^0.91.0.22out of date
 serde^11.0.198up to date
 serde_yaml ⚠️^0.80.9.34+deprecatedout of date
 typed-builder^0.30.18.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

serde_yaml: Uncontrolled recursion leads to abort in deserialization

RUSTSEC-2018-0005

Affected versions of this crate did not properly check for recursion while deserializing aliases.

This allows an attacker to make a YAML file with an alias referring to itself causing an abort.

The flaw was corrected by checking the recursion depth.

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

ed25519-dalek: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on `ed25519-dalek`

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

Versions of ed25519-dalek prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.

Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S part of the signature, but not in the R value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R and only differ on the S part.

Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.

Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.