This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate chumsky

Dependencies

(10 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 either^1.8.11.15.0up to date
 hashbrown ⚠️^0.150.17.1out of date
 lexical^6.1.17.0.5out of date
 railroad^0.3.30.3.7up to date
 regex-automata^0.40.4.14up to date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 stacker^0.10.1.24up to date
 unicode-ident^1.0.101.0.24up to date
 unicode-segmentation^11.13.2up to date

Dev dependencies

(14 total, 5 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 ariadne^0.50.6.0out of date
 ciborium^0.20.2.2up to date
 criterion^0.4.00.8.2out of date
 lasso^0.70.7.3up to date
 logos^0.130.16.1out of date
 nom^88.0.0up to date
 pest^2.52.8.6up to date
 pest_derive^2.52.8.6up to date
 pom^3.23.4.0up to date
 pprof^0.110.15.0out of date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 slotmap^1.01.1.1up to date
 sn^0.10.1.2up to date
 winnow^0.7.01.0.2out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

hashbrown: Borsh serialization of HashMap is non-canonical

RUSTSEC-2024-0402

The borsh serialization of the HashMap did not follow the borsh specification. It potentially produced non-canonical encodings dependent on insertion order. It also did not perform canonicty checks on decoding.

This can result in consensus splits and cause equivalent objects to be considered distinct.

This was patched in 0.15.1.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.