This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.
cel(11 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| antlr4rust | ^0.5.2 | 0.5.2 | up to date |
| base64 | ^0.22.1 | 0.22.1 | up to date |
| bytes ⚠️ | ^1 | 1.12.0 | maybe insecure |
| chrono ⚠️ | ^0.4 | 0.4.45 | maybe insecure |
| lazy_static | ^1.5.0 | 1.5.0 | up to date |
| nom | ^7.1.3 | 8.0.0 | out of date |
| pastey | ^0.2.1 | 0.2.3 | up to date |
| regex | ^1.10.5 | 1.12.4 | up to date |
| serde | ^1.0 | 1.0.228 | up to date |
| serde_json | ^1.0 | 1.0.150 | up to date |
| thiserror | ^1.0 | 2.0.18 | out of date |
(3 total, 1 outdated)
| Crate | Required | Latest | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| criterion | ^0.5.1 | 0.8.2 | out of date |
| dhat | ^0.3.3 | 0.3.3 | up to date |
| serde_bytes | ^0.11.14 | 0.11.19 | up to date |
chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocationsUnix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.
No workarounds are known.
bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition
if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset
uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.
This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.
use bytes::*;
fn main() {
let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
let mut b = a.split_off(5);
// Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
drop(a);
// Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);
// This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
b.put_u8(b'h');
}
Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.