Deps.rs

cargo-xwin 0.19.2

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/cargo-xwin/0.19.2/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/cargo-xwin/0.19.2)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate cargo-xwin

Dependencies

(17 total, 2 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 anyhow^1.0.531.0.102up to date
 cargo-config2^0.1.40.1.44up to date
 cargo-options^0.7.60.7.6up to date
 clap^4.3.04.6.0up to date
 dirs^6.0.06.0.0up to date
 fs-err^3.0.03.3.0up to date
 humantime^2.1.02.3.0up to date
 indicatif^0.17.20.18.4out of date
 paste^1.0.121.0.15up to date
 path-slash^0.2.00.2.1up to date
 serde^1.0.2161.0.228up to date
 tar ⚠️^0.4.430.4.45maybe insecure
 tracing-subscriber ⚠️^0.3.170.3.23maybe insecure
 ureq^3.0.123.3.0up to date
 which^8.0.08.0.2up to date
 xwin^0.6.60.8.0out of date
 xz2^0.1.70.1.7up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tracing-subscriber: Logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences

RUSTSEC-2025-0055

Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:

  • Manipulate terminal title bars
  • Clear screens or modify terminal display
  • Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation

In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.

This was patched in PR #3368 to escape ANSI control characters from user input.

tar: `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks

RUSTSEC-2026-0067

In versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because fs::metadata() follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

tar: tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

RUSTSEC-2026-0068

Versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero.

As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.

Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size — other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.