This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate binance-client

Dependencies

(13 total, 6 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.38maybe insecure
 env_logger^0.60.11.3out of date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 hex^0.30.4.3out of date
 hmac^0.70.12.1out of date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 reqwest^0.90.12.4out of date
 rust_decimal^1.01.35.0up to date
 serde^1.01.0.198up to date
 serde_derive^1.01.0.198up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.116up to date
 sha2^0.80.10.8out of date
 websocket ⚠️^0.220.27.1out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

websocket: Unbounded memory allocation based on untrusted length

RUSTSEC-2022-0035

Impact

Untrusted websocket connections can cause an out-of-memory (OOM) process abort in a client or a server. The root cause of the issue is during dataframe parsing. Affected versions would allocate a buffer based on the declared dataframe size, which may come from an untrusted source. When Vec::with_capacity fails to allocate, the default Rust allocator will abort the current process, killing all threads. This affects only sync (non-Tokio) implementation. Async version also does not limit memory, but does not use with_capacity, so DoS can happen only when bytes for oversized dataframe or message actually got delivered by the attacker.

This is a security concern for you, if

  • your server application handles untrusted websocket connections
  • OR your client application connects to untrusted websocket servers

Patches

The crashes are fixed in version 0.26.5 by imposing default dataframe size limits. Affected users are advised to update to this version.

Note that default memory limits are rather large (100MB dataframes and 200 MB messages), so they can still cause DoS in some environments (i.e. 32-bit). New API has been added to fine tune those limits for specific applications.

Workarounds

  • Migrate your project to another, maintained Websocket library like Tungstenite.
  • Accept only trusted WebSocket traffic.
  • Filter the WebSocket traffic though some kind of proxy that ensures sanity limits on messages.
  • Handle process aborts gracefully and limit process memory using OS tools.

Credits

This issue was reported by Evan Richter at ForAllSecure and found with Mayhem and Cargo Fuzz.