This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate awc

Dependencies

(21 total, 7 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 actix-codec^0.4.00.5.2out of date
 actix-http^3.0.0-beta.113.12.0up to date
 actix-rt^2.12.11.0up to date
 actix-service^2.0.02.0.3up to date
 base64^0.130.22.1out of date
 bytes ⚠️^11.11.1maybe insecure
 cfg-if^11.0.4up to date
 cookie^0.150.18.1out of date
 derive_more^0.99.52.1.1out of date
 futures-core^0.3.70.3.32up to date
 itoa^0.41.0.17out of date
 log^0.40.4.29up to date
 mime^0.30.3.17up to date
 percent-encoding^2.12.3.2up to date
 pin-project-lite^0.20.2.17up to date
 rand^0.80.10.0out of date
 serde^1.01.0.228up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.149up to date
 serde_urlencoded^0.70.7.1up to date
 openssl ⚠️^0.10.90.10.76maybe insecure
 rustls ⚠️^0.20.00.23.37out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls: `rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input

RUSTSEC-2024-0336

If a close_notify alert is received during a handshake, complete_io does not terminate.

Callers which do not call complete_io are not affected.

rustls-tokio and rustls-ffi do not call complete_io and are not affected.

rustls::Stream and rustls::StreamOwned types use complete_io and are affected.

openssl: Use-After-Free in `Md::fetch` and `Cipher::fetch`

RUSTSEC-2025-0022

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

bytes: Integer overflow in `BytesMut::reserve`

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.