This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate async-tungstenite

Dependencies

(12 total, 7 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-std^1.01.12.0up to date
 futures^0.30.3.30up to date
 gio^0.80.19.4out of date
 glib^0.90.19.4out of date
 log^0.40.4.21up to date
 pin-project^0.41.1.5out of date
 async-native-tls^0.3.00.5.0out of date
 async-tls^0.6.00.13.0out of date
 native-tls^0.20.2.11up to date
 tokio-tls^0.30.3.1up to date
 tokio ⚠️^0.21.37.0out of date
 tungstenite ⚠️^0.9.20.21.0out of date

Dev dependencies

(3 total, 1 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 async-std^1.01.12.0up to date
 env_logger^0.70.11.3out of date
 url^2.0.02.5.0up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

tokio: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a `oneshot` channel

RUSTSEC-2021-0124

If a tokio::sync::oneshot channel is closed (via the oneshot::Receiver::close method), a data race may occur if the oneshot::Sender::send method is called while the corresponding oneshot::Receiver is awaited or calling try_recv.

When these methods are called concurrently on a closed channel, the two halves of the channel can concurrently access a shared memory location, resulting in a data race. This has been observed to cause memory corruption.

Note that the race only occurs when both halves of the channel are used after the Receiver half has called close. Code where close is not used, or where the Receiver is not awaited and try_recv is not called after calling close, is not affected.

See tokio#4225 for more details.

tungstenite: Tungstenite allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service

RUSTSEC-2023-0065

The Tungstenite crate through 0.20.0 for Rust allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (minutes of CPU consumption) via an excessive length of an HTTP header in a client handshake. The length affects both how many times a parse is attempted (e.g., thousands of times) and the average amount of data for each parse attempt (e.g., millions of bytes).