Deps.rs

async-nats 0.34.0

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/async-nats/0.34.0/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/async-nats/0.34.0)

This project contains known security vulnerabilities. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate async-nats

Dependencies

(25 total, 7 outdated, 1 insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 base64^0.220.23.1out of date
 bytes^1.4.01.12.1up to date
 futures^0.3.280.3.34up to date
 memchr^2.42.8.3up to date
 nkeys^0.40.4.5up to date
 nuid^0.50.6.0out of date
 once_cell^1.18.01.21.4up to date
 portable-atomic^11.15.0up to date
 rand^0.80.10.2out of date
 regex^1.9.11.13.1up to date
 ring^0.170.17.14up to date
 rustls-native-certs^0.70.8.4out of date
 rustls-pemfile^22.2.0up to date
 serde^1.0.1841.0.229up to date
 serde_json^1.0.1041.0.151up to date
 serde_nanos^0.1.30.1.4up to date
 serde_repr^0.1.160.1.21up to date
 thiserror^1.02.0.20out of date
 time^0.3.240.3.55up to date
 tokio^1.361.53.1up to date
 tokio-rustls^0.250.26.5out of date
 tracing^0.10.1.44up to date
 tryhard^0.50.5.2up to date
 url^22.5.8up to date
 rustls-webpki ⚠️^0.1020.103.15insecure

Dev dependencies

(8 total, 4 outdated)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 criterion^0.50.8.2out of date
 futures^0.3.280.3.34up to date
 jsonschema^0.17.10.56.0out of date
 num^0.4.10.4.3up to date
 rand^0.80.10.2out of date
 reqwest^0.11.180.13.5out of date
 tokio^1.25.01.53.1up to date
 tracing-subscriber^0.30.3.23up to date

Security Vulnerabilities

rustls-webpki: CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic

RUSTSEC-2026-0049

If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted

RUSTSEC-2026-0098

Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.

Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name

RUSTSEC-2026-0099

Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.

This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.

This vulnerability is identified as GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh. Thank you to @1seal for the report.

rustls-webpki: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing

RUSTSEC-2026-0104

A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der] or [OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty BIT STRING appearing in the onlySomeReasons element of a IssuingDistributionPoint CRL extension.

This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.

Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.

Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.