Deps.rs

amethyst_ui 0.10.0

[![dependency status](https://deps.rs/crate/amethyst_ui/0.10.0/status.svg)](https://deps.rs/crate/amethyst_ui/0.10.0)

This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate amethyst_ui

Dependencies

(27 total, 17 outdated, 2 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 amethyst_assets^0.11.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_audio^0.10.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_core^0.10.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_derive^0.8.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_error^0.5.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_input^0.11.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_rendy^0.5.00.15.3out of date
 amethyst_window^0.5.00.15.3out of date
 clipboard^0.50.5.0up to date
 derivative^1.02.2.0out of date
 derive-new^0.5.60.6.0out of date
 failure^0.10.1.8up to date
 fnv^11.0.7up to date
 font-kit^0.50.13.0out of date
 glsl-layout ⚠️^0.30.5.0out of date
 glyph_brush^0.6.00.7.8out of date
 lazy_static^1.41.4.0up to date
 log^0.4.60.4.21up to date
 paste^0.11.0.14out of date
 rand^0.70.8.5out of date
 ron^0.50.8.1out of date
 serde^1.01.0.198up to date
 smallvec ⚠️^1.21.13.2maybe insecure
 thread_profiler^0.30.3.0up to date
 unicode-normalization^0.10.1.23up to date
 unicode-segmentation^1.61.11.0up to date
 winit^0.190.29.15out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

smallvec: Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many

RUSTSEC-2021-0003

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

glsl-layout: Double drop upon panic in 'fn map_array()'

RUSTSEC-2021-0005

Affected versions of this crate did not guard against panic within the user-provided function f (2nd parameter of fn map_array), and thus panic within f causes double drop of a single object.

The flaw was corrected in the 0.4.0 release by wrapping the object vulnerable to a double drop within ManuallyDrop<T>.